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Did Russian Cyber Interference in the
2016 Election Violate International Law?
Jens David Ohlin*
Introduction
Sovereignty is a funny thing. It is allegedly the foundation of the
Westphalian order, but its exact contours are frustratingly indeterminate.
When it was revealed that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election by, among other things, hacking into the e-mail system
of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and releasing its e-mails,
international lawyers were divided over whether the cyber attack violated
international law. President Obama seemingly went out of his way to
describe the attack as a mere violation of "established international norms of
behavior" and pointedly declined to refer to the cyber attacks as a violation
of international law.'
Some international lawyers were more willing to describe the cyber
attack as a violation of international law.2 However, identifying the exact
legal norm that was contravened turns out to be harder than it might otherwise
appear. To the layperson, the Russian hacking constituted an impermissible
(and perhaps) shocking interference in the American political process-an
intervention that nonlawyers would not hesitate to label a "violation of
sovereignty" as that term is used in political or diplomatic discourse.3 The
problem arises when one attempts to translate that commonsense intuition
into legal discourse. At that point, the translation effort breaks down for a
variety of reasons.
The genesis of the difficulty is that none of the standard rubrics for
understanding illegal interventions clearly and unambiguously apply to the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President
on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/statement-president-actions-
response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity [https://perma.cc/T6UC-6K2Z]. One reason Obama
may have been unwilling to describe the attack as illegal was because the U.S. government might
want the flexibility to conduct similar operations in the future, without conceding that they are
illegal.
2. See, e.g., Steven J. Barela, Cross-Border Cyber Ops to Erode Legitimacy: An Act of
Coercion, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36212/cross-border-cyber-
ops-erode-legitimacy-act-coercion/ [https://perma.cc/UKH6-JDSQ] (arguing that Russian
intervention in the 2016 presidential election was an act of coercion violating international law). It
is also beyond question that the cyber attack violated various American statutes, including, possibly,
18 U.S.C. § 2701.
3. For a discussion, see Sean Watts, International Law and Proposed U.S. Responses to the
D.N.C Hack, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33558/international-
law-proposed-u-s-responses-d-n-c-hack/ [https://perma.cc/J2MM-XXMC].
Texas Law Review
facts in question. For example, the Russian interference could simply be
viewed as an act of espionage, but it has long been understood (at least until
recent controversies in human rights law) that spying violates domestic-but
not international-law. An alternative rubric would focus on the intervention
aspect of Russia's behavior. The problem here is that the standard-though
by no means universally accepted-definition for what counts as an illegal
intervention requires doctrinal elements such as coercion that may not be
present in this case. So too with regard to the notion of an illegal "usurpation
of an inherently governmental function," a legal description that is a poor fit
for Russia's hacking during the 2016 election, for reasons that will be more
fully articulated below.
That being said, it would be a mistake to hastily reject our commonsense
intuitions about the impropriety of Russian hacking during the election. The
lack of fit with the doctrinal requirements for an illegal intervention against
another State's sovereignty is simply an indication that the notions of
"sovereignty" and "intervention"-though mainstays of contemporary public
international law doctrine-are poorly suited to analyzing the legality of the
conduct in this case. A far better rubric for analyzing the behavior is the
notion of self-determination, a legal concept that captures the right of a
people to decide, for themselves, both their political arrangements (at a
systematic level) and their future destiny (at a more granular level of policy).
It is precisely this more basic right of self-determination that was violated by
Russia's conduct. Unfortunately, the right of self-determination has largely
lain fallow since the global process of decolonization was completed,' with
the exception of a few cases of controversial secessions.6 But the Russian
hacking campaign is evidence that self-determination's departure from the
scene in international law should be mourned and, if possible, reversed
because there are situations and cases where the best legal categories for
understanding the situation are not sovereignty and intervention but rather
the frustratingly imprecise notion of self-determination.7
Accordingly, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will analyze the
law of espionage and spying, which are widespread practices in today's
4. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS
23 (Michael M. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
5. For a longer discussion of this phenomenon, see Jens David Ohlin, The Right to Exist and
the Right to Resist, in THE THEORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 70, 72 (Fernando R. Teson ed., 2016)
(describing self-determination as "a right that is universally recognized as central and indisputable
in international law, but unfortunately of very little practical significance").
6. For an example where self-determination played an important role in the legal analysis, see
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.) (denying Quebec's claims that
it had the right to secede under international law because self-determination allows secession only
when "a people" is governed as part of a colonial empire; subject to alien subjugation, domination,
or exploitation; or possibly when denied any meaningful exercise of self-determination).
7. See Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
209, 221 (1991) (noting that the vague notion of self-determination had only been applied in
colonialist contexts).
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world. Though spying was once condemned as illegal under international
law, that historical mistake has been rectified, and most international lawyers
agree that spying violates domestic rather than international law. Part I will
then query whether spying violates a human right to privacy, an argument
that suggests that the Russian hacking might have violated international
human rights law. Part I will conclude by outlining the obstacles to this
argument.
Part II will focus on impermissible interventions against sovereignty and
in particular on the requirement of coercion. The concept of coercion can be
defined narrowly or broadly, with huge consequences for the outcome of the
analysis in this case. Unfortunately, there is little in international law that
outlines a complete theory of coercion-for that, one must look to
philosophy. Finally, Part III will offer a conceptual argument that seeks to
recast the sovereignty argument with a new legal architecture built from the
raw materials of self-determination. The result of the argument is that the
Russian cyber intervention in the 2016 election may very well have violated
international law, but not for the reason that most lawyers assume. In making
these arguments, the Article will make extensive reference to the Tallinn
Manual on Cyber Operations, which offers the most up-to-date guidance on
the law of cyber activities under international law.' Although some of the
Manual's statements and conclusions of law are controversial, it is
nonetheless undeniable that the document is the most complete rendering of
an emerging (but not universal) consensus regarding the law in this area.
One final methodological point is in order. This Article assumes that
the facts currently in the public domain, and as reported by the U.S.
intelligence agencies,9 are accurate. This Article is not the right place to
conduct an independent analysis of the factual underpinning of the
intelligence assessment. Moreover, some facts will simply be assumed. This
Article will assume that the hacking involved State action on the part of the
Russian government, as opposed to private behavior. Also, this Article will
assume that the attribution requirement is satisfied and that there is sufficient
evidence to link the hacking with the Russian government. Moreover, in
conducting the legal analysis, it is important to look at the entire event
together rather than segmenting the Russian cyber interference into isolated
behaviors. It is not just that the Russian government engaged in cyber
intrusions against the DNC, that they disclosed e-mails to WikiLeaks, that
they distributed the e-mails, that they did not engage in the same activity to
the Grand Old Party, and that they deployed other cyber resources to spread
fake news stories on social media. It is all of it taken together that paints an
8. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 1.
9. See generally OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (Jan. 6, 2017) [hereinafter ASSESSING RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES].
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entire picture of cyber interference in the 2016 election. It is this total picture
that will be evaluated in this Article.
I. Spying, Surveillance & Privacy
One obvious way of analyzing the Russian intervention is to focus
exclusively on the illicit and unauthorized access to specific computer
networks and specific e-mail accounts-access that sounds like spying under
a layperson's definition of spying. However, while spying is clearly a
violation of U.S. law, it is a separate question whether it is a violation of
international law, which has a more limited scope.
A. Spying Under International Humanitarian Law
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the conviction at a military
commission of Nazi operatives who landed on the east coast of the United
States with orders to proceed covertly across the homeland to sabotage key
civilian and military installations.o In its decision, the Supreme Court noted,
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of
a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and
communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without
uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging
war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of
belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status
of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject
to trial and punishment by military tribunals."
With this phrase, the Supreme Court seemed to convey that spies were
subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions because spying violates
the international law of war.
Over time, most international lawyers have come to view the Quirin
holding as resting on a mistaken assumption, insofar as it relies on the notion
that spying represents a violation of the international law of war. Richard
Baxter, in his famous article on spies, saboteurs, and guerillas, spoke for a
scholarly consensus when he concluded that the Quirin Court had suffered
from a basic but understandable confusion: the difference between a violation
of international law and a violation of domestic law that is unprivileged under
international law.12 Spying falls into the latter category, not the former.
10. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21-23, 48 (1942).
11. Id. at 31.
12. RICHARD BAXTER, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, in HUMANIZING THE LAWS OF WAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF RICHARD BAXTER 37,44
(Detlev F. Vagts et al. eds., 2013).
13. This issue is also raised by the appellate litigation in Al Bahlul, which concerns the
applicability of the conspiracy charge before military commissions. See United States v. Al Bahlul,
820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1167, 1183 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011), vacated, No. 11-1324, 2013 WL 297726
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacatedin part,
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B. Privacy Under Human Rights Law
The established view that spying is not a violation of international law
has recently come under attack from human rights lawyers who note that the
right to privacy is protected by international and European human rights law.
For example, Article 17 of the ICCPR states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation."14
According to this provision, it would seem as if Russia's cyber intrusion
violated the human rights of the owners of the various e-mail accounts,
including John Podesta and several DNC officials. Indeed, the reference in
Article 17 to "correspondence" would seem to be especially relevant to this
case.
International lawyers studying intelligence surveillance were late to
recognize the significance of Article 17 and similar provisions in other
human rights instruments protecting the right to privacy. However, with the
revelation of global surveillance efforts by the National Security Agency and
similar agencies in other countries-some of which were disclosed by
Edward Snowden-human rights activists have harnessed international
human rights law as a potential rubric with which to resist mass-surveillance
efforts." If these provisions apply, they may suggest that the legal status of
spying may have changed since the time of Quirin. Despite the fact that
spying is a widespread or even universal tool of statecraft, the adoption of the
ICCPR and ECHR may have outlawed the practice.
However, there are several obstacles to this "spying as a violation of the
right to privacy" argument. First, human rights provisions were originally
conceptualized as constraints against a government's conduct towards its
own citizens.16 So, for example, Article 17 would constrain and prohibit
Russian attempts to spy on its own citizens, or U.S. attempts to spy on
Americans-at least if they are arbitrary or unlawful (lawful or nonarbitrary
spying, i.e., authorized by domestic statute, would not necessarily be covered
792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), vacated en banc, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016). At issue is how to
read the Quirin precedent, given the Court's confusion between international offenses and domestic
offenses that are unprivileged. One way of reading Quirin is that the Court upheld jurisdiction of
military commissions for domestic offenses (because spying is a domestic offense). Another way
of reading the case is that the Court upheld jurisdiction of military commissions for international
offenses only, because the Court was laboring under the mistaken view that spying was a direct
violation of international law.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOc.
E (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
15. The Tallinn Manual recognizes that human rights law may be a constraint on cyber-related
activities. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 316. However, its statements relate mostly
to surveillance within the territorial State, rather than extraterritorial surveillance. See id.
16. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 37 (1990) ("Acting with other States (the State as
legislator), each State agrees to recognize and give legal status in the international system to 'human
rights' as claims that every individual has-or should have-upon his or her own society.").
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by the provision). In the 2016 election, the spying by Russia targeted
American citizens, and it is unclear whether the Article 17 right to privacy
was meant to cover such transnational conduct.
The second problem is that foreign spying is so widespread that
customary international law arguably does not prohibit it. There are two
responses to this objection. The first is that a customary international law
analysis should not displace a treaty-based analysis. So whether spying
violates customary international law does not answer whether spying violates
a particular treaty provision. This is a common problem with international
law discourse-the tendency to evaluate all conduct under the rubric of
customary international law, even if a treaty covers the conduct. Often, these
invocations of customary international law are purportedly justified by
claims that customary international law runs parallel to the treaty provisions.
But even if that were the case, the conduct only needs to be illegal according
to one source of international law.
The other response is an appeal to "the subsequent practice of the
parties"-a doctrine that encourages reference to the practice of States as a
means of treaty interpretation.' Under this methodology, the fact that States
all engage in spying-and rarely criticize it as illegal-could be relevant for
an interpretation of Article 17 and other treaty provisions. Unfortunately,
this methodology is vastly overused in contemporary legal discourse; it is
objectionable because it threatens to transform treaty interpretation into a
kind of ersatz customary international law analysis (based on State practice).
State practice is important but only when the norm flows from custom; when
a norm flows from treaty law, State practice ought to fade in relevance.
Indeed, even under the interpretive doctrine of the "subsequent practice of
the parties," the method should only be used when it is clear that the parties
are acting pursuant to the treaty-in all other cases the practice of the parties
is not a relevant method for analyzing an ambiguous treaty provision." This
methodology seems especially ill-suited to analyzing human rights treaties,
which demonstrate a unique structure that is not at all analogous to the typical
bilateral arrangement. Human rights treaties are multilateral conventions that
have individuals as their primary beneficiaries. The fact that most nations
ignore their obligations under particular human rights provisions ought not
to be an argument that the conduct therefore does not violate a human rights
17. Luigi Crema, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice Within and Outside the
Vienna Convention, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 13, 14-18 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013)
(discussing the origins and interpretive frameworks of "the subsequent practice of the parties").
18. See Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), Int'l L. Comm'n, Second Report on Subsequent
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, ¶¶ 4-11, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/671 (Mar. 26, 2014) (defining "in the application" and "regarding the interpretation"
of the treaty).
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obligation.19 That conclusion would turn human rights treaties on their head
by whitewashing widespread noncompliance and transforming it into
compliance by redefining the relevant norm.20
At the end of the day, treaty interpretation is different from customary
international law, and ought to be. Although State practice can be relevant
for treaty interpretation under the rubric of subsequent practice of the parties,
there are substantial constraints on the application of this methodology.2 '
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the subsequent practice of States ought to
be relevant in the context of human rights treaties, where the ultimate
beneficiary of the relevant provision are individuals per se, whose subsequent
practice would be largely ignored under a putative rule that allows a
subsequent practice of widespread noncompliance to effectively gut the core
of important human rights provisions codified in binding human rights
instruments.
C Extraterritorial Obligations Under Human Rights Law
The bigger problem with concluding that Russian spying during the
2016 election violated the ICCPR is the question of the treaty's
extraterritorial scope. The ICCPR requires:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.22
The question is the proper scope of the qualification "to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." 23 One interpretation is that
this qualification applies to both the obligation to respect and the obligation
to ensure. This suggests that the treaty has little or no extraterritorial scope.
19. For a similar argument, see Sean D. Murphy, The Relevance of Subsequent Agreement and
Subsequent Practice for the Interpretation of Treaties, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE
82, 91 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013) (suggesting that human rights tribunals may shy away from the
subsequent practice methodology because it would diminish rather than enhance human rights
norms).
20. An overreliance on practice also has the opposite problem as well. If States are engaging
in a particular practice, it does not automatically mean that the practice demonstrates that they are
required to engage in the activity. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 197, 201-02 (July 20) (separate opinion of Fitzmaurice, J.) (arguing that
voluntary State expenditures do not imply an obligation for such spending).
21. For example, Nolte argues that "[t]he examples from the case law and State practice
substantiate the need to identify and interpret carefully subsequent agreements and subsequent
practice, in particular to ask whether the parties, by an agreement or a practice, assume a position
regarding the interpretation of a treaty, or whether they are motivated by other considerations."
Nolte, supra note 18, at 11.
22. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 2.
23. Id.
2017] 1585
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In other words, Russia has an obligation to respect and ensure the right to
privacy of individuals within its territory, which would exclude DNC
officials living in the United States.
Some human rights scholars have recently suggested that this narrow
reading of Article 2 is far too restrictive. They suggest that the phrase "to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction" applies only to
the obligation to ensure, and that by contrast, the obligation "to respect" is
territorially unbounded and applies across the globe.24 If this view is correct,
then Russia has an obligation to respect the privacy of all individuals around
the world (and then has the further obligation to "ensure" this right to those
living in Russia). But the more basic obligation applies universally. If this is
true, the hacking violated the ICCPR.
The problem with the U.S. asserting this reading of the ICCPR is that
the U.S. insists that the ICCPR does not have this broad extraterritorial scope.
This legal question was the subject of intense interdepartmental dispute
toward the end of the Obarna Administration. The longstanding view of the
U.S. government has been that most provisions of the ICCPR do not apply
extraterritorially. 25 In 2010, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh
authored a memorandum that argued that this established view was wrong
and that the legal argument in favor of extraterritoriality ought to be given
greater credence.26 Ultimately, though, after pushback from other executive
agencies, the Administration did not adopt the Koh memorandum as official
U.S. legal policy. If Koh is right, though, this would provide one avenue
through which to view the Russian interference as unlawful, i.e., a violation
of international human rights law. However, it is not an argument that the
U.S. will adopt anytime soon-at least not until it changes its position on the
extraterritorial scope of human rights obligations.
24. See MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 18 (2011) (describing the difference between two types
of State obligations, the negative obligation to "respect" and the positive obligation to "ensure"
human rights).
25. See U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, 53d Sess., 1405th mtg. ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR
1405 (Apr. 24, 1995) (State Department Legal Advisor Conrad Harper stating, "The Covenant was
not regarded as having extraterritorial application [by the U.S. government]. In general, where the
scope of application of a treaty was not specified, it was presumed to apply only within a party's
territory"); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 469, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005) ("The
United States continues to consider that its view is correct that the obligations it has assumed under
the Covenant do not have extraterritorial reach.").
26. U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic
Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2010) ("[T]he
Covenant does impose certain obligations on a State Party's extraterritorial conduct under certain
circumstances.").
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II. Violations of Domaine Riservd
The more likely and potentially fruitful rubric for analyzing the Russian
cyber interference with the 2016 election is the concept of sovereignty.
Under bread-and-butter principles of public international law, States are
prohibited from interfering with another State's sovereignty. These actions
can be understood as either an "interference" against another State's
sovereignty or as an illegal "usurpation" of a State's inherently governmental
21power. Either way, both avenues flow from the basic building blocks of
sovereignty. As this Part demonstrates, however, the technical requirements
for an illegal intervention might not apply to the Russian intervention,
depending on how one understands the concept of coercion.
A. The Concept of Domaine R6serv6
When speaking about the general prohibition against interfering with
another State's sovereignty, public international lawyers often refer to a
State's domaine reserv6, its exclusive power to regulate its internal affairs
without outside interference. 28 Indeed, the notion of domaine riservd would
seem to be constitutive of the descriptive and normative uses of the phrase
"sovereignty," in the sense that being a sovereign State naturally entails the
power to act as the sovereign.29 This is the enduring notion of sovereign
prerogative.
Unfortunately, despite the patina of precision in its French rendering,
the concept has little internally generated content. It has to be spelled out
with reference to theories and concepts that are external to the notion of
27. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 20. The Tallinn Manual explains that
sovereignty can be violated by an intervention against or usurpation of a State's essential functions:
The second basis upon which the Experts determined a violation of sovereignty occurs
is when one State's cyber operation interferes with or usurps the inherently
governmental functions of another State. This is because the target State enjoys the
exclusive right to perform them, or to decide upon their performance. It matters not
whether physical damage, injury, or loss of functionality has resulted or whether the
operation qualifies in accordance with the various differing positions outlined above
for operations that do not result in a loss of functionality.
Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
28. Galina G. Shinkaretskaya, Content and Limits of 'Domaine Rgservd', in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND MuNICIPAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET COLLOQUY ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE INSTITUT FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT AN DER UNIVERSITAT
KIEL, 4 To 8 MAY 1987, 123, at 123-24 (Grigory I. Tunkin & Rildiger Wolfrum eds., 1988); see
also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 15, 314-17 (discussing the relationship between
sovereignty and domaine riserv).
29. See Shinkaretskaya, supra note 28, at 124-25 (discussing the U.N. Declaration of Principles
and limits of domestic sovereignty); see also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, pmbl. (Oct. 24, 1970) (detailing principles of
noninterference in the affairs of other States but noting that States have the duty to refrain from
forcible actions that deprive peoples of their rights to self-determination, freedom, and
independence).
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sovereignty. The notion of sovereign prerogative has limits, and almost
every international lawyer would agree with this. The question is where to
locate the limit-which domains or activities should be off-limits because
they fall within a State's domaine reservd and which domains are subject to
foreign action.
The Tallinn Manual argues that an intervention against a State's choice
of political structure would count as an infringement against its domaine
riservd, but only in the case where the intervention is accompanied by some
degree of coercion. So, for example, the drafters of the Tallinn Manual do
not view the spreading of propaganda as, by itself, indicative of an illegal
intervention against another State's domaine riserv.30 In prior international
conflicts, the United States and other countries have dropped leaflets on the
territory of another State in order to convince a foreign population to pressure
its leaders into a course of action.3 1 The Voice of America broadcasts across
the globe in order to provide information to foreign audiences. The
government of South Korea places loudspeakers near the border with North
Korea in order to disseminate news and information that might not otherwise
reach its epistemically isolated population.3 2 No one denies that Putin would
have been permitted to speak publicly on Russia Today, the decidedly pro-
Putin State television network, and declare his support for Trump and urge
all Americans to vote for him. This right to engage in the political process is
hardly a violation of America's domaine riservy.
B. The Requirement of Coercion
In order to find that there was an impermissible intervention, the Tallinn
Manual points to the requirement of coercion, a doctrinal element that flows
from the Nicaragua judgment.33 In order to count as illegal intervention, the
30. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 26.
[T]he International Group of Experts agreed that [propaganda] transmission into other
States is generally not a violation of sovereignty. However, the transmission of
propaganda, depending on its nature, might violate other rules of international law. For
instance, propaganda designed to incite civil unrest in another State would likely
violate the prohibition of intervention (Rule 66). Similarly, propaganda by a vessel in
transit through the territorial sea renders the passage noninnocent (Rule 48).
Id.
31. See BARAK KUSHNER, THE THOUGHT WAR: JAPANESE IMPERIAL PROPAGANDA 151
(2006) (detailing the leafletting campaign undertaken by the United States in the Pacific Theater of
World War II); HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA 160 (2004) (summarizing
various propaganda efforts used by countries during World War II); THE U.S. AIR SERVICE IN
WORLD WAR I, VOLUME IV: POSTWAR REVIEW 221 (1979) (noting leafletting efforts of the
American Air Service during World War I).
32. Julian Ryall & Colin Freeman, South Korea Uses Loudspeakers to Blast North Korea with
'Popaganda', TELEGRAPH (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
northkorea/12088568/north-south-korea-pop-music-loudspeakers.html [https://perma.cc/2YW7-
JGP3).
33. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 315 n.768; Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27)
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structure of the interaction must have the following form: engage in this
action; otherwise you will suffer a particular consequence. Then, the State
complies with the coercive demand because it finds the promised
consequence to be intolerable to live with.
A key element here is the assumption that the threatened consequence
constitutes an illegal or wrongful action. Although never stated explicitly,
this assumption is arguably implicit in the Nicaragua judgment, in part
because the court concluded that actions of the United States constituted an
illegal use of force under international law. In contrast, if the threatened
consequence is an action that the threatening State clearly has the authority
under international law to engage in, then the action is merely an example of
bald strategic behavior, not coercion per se. So, for example, in the
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice concluded that the mining
of the harbor waters (and support for the Contras) constituted illegal
intervention because the United States did not have the right to mine the
harbor and the action constituted a use of force in violation of the U.N.
Charter and customary law.34 If, on the other hand, a State mounts a naval
blockade in a situation when the blockade is permissible under international
law, it cannot count as an example of coercion just because the target of the
blockade views the situation as intolerable and therefore capitulates. The
same thing might be said of a sanctions regime where the underlying
sanctions are consistent with international law. So the key to an
impermissible act of coercion is that it forces the target State to act by virtue
of its desire to avoid the consequences that flow from a threatening State's
illegal or impermissible action.35
However, it is not obviously the case that the Nicaragua paradigm for
coercion is the correct interpretation. Although there is not much law on this
question in the burgeoning field of the international law of cyber operations,
the issue has been raised and analyzed in numerous other fields, including
domestic law and philosophy. For example, in the philosophical literature on
coercion, most scholars writing in this area have assumed that what makes
coercion wrongful is that the coercer threatens an outcome that makes the
target worse off.3 6 Some scholars argue that even conditional offers-which
might make the target better off-can be coercive because they may
("Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion .... The element of coercion ...
defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention. . . .
34. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 128, IT 251-52.
35. It is unclear whether a causal requirement must be satisfied. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
supra note 4, at 320 (noting its experts were "divided").
36. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 447
(Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (arguing that a threat makes the consequences of a person's
actions "worse than they would have been in the normal and expected course of events").
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constitute an offer so good that it cannot be refused.3 7 The difference between
a conditional threat and a conditional offer is a nonarbitrary baseline against
which we can label something as a benefit or a burden. Some scholars believe
that the baseline is the "normal or natural or expected course of events,"38
while others insist that establishing a coherent baseline will inevitably be
arbitrary, and therefore that offers can be coercive.3 9  Under either
understanding, there is no requirement that the conditional threat or offer
involve an otherwise illegal action. One prominent exception is Mitchell
Berman, who concludes that wrongful coercion involves threats to engage in
otherwise impermissible actions.40 Berman's argument is that coercion is
wrongful because it involves threatening to do an action which itself is
impermissible; the impermissibility of the threat flows from the
impermissibility of the completed action, even if it is never required (because
the threat is successful).
In domestic law, coercion does not always require the threatening of a
consequence that constitutes an illegal or impermissible act, i.e., something
that the threatening agent is not permitted to do. Consider the U.S. Supreme
Court's review of Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. Sebelius.4 1 In Sebelius, the
question facing the Court was whether Congress had engaged in
impermissible coercion by attaching a condition to the funds that the federal
government provides to States for their Medicaid programs.42 The condition
required the States to expand their Medicaid programs or risk losing federal
funding for Medicaid entirely (not just for the expansion).4 3 The Supreme
Court had already determined, back in South Dakota v. Dole, that Congress
could use its spending power to induce compliance by sovereign States." In
that case, Congress had tied federal funding for highways to the drinking age,
so that States were required to raise their drinking age to twenty-one or risk
losing five percent of the funding that they received from the federal
37. See, e.g., Virginia Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in COERCION: NOMOS XIV 49, 54
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (discussing whether offers can be coercive).
38. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 36, at 447; see also Coercion, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (2011), https://plato.standford.edulentris/coercion/ [https://perma.cc/KUB6-
H83N].
39. See, e.g., Held, supra note 37, at 56-57 (explaining the difficulty in defining coercion in a
way that excludes the possibility of coercive offers); David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10
PHIL. &PUB. AFF. 121, 131 (1981) (proposing a framework to accommodate coercive offers without
recourse to a moral baseline).
40. See Mitchell Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45,
55 (2002) (defining a coercive act as an act that "involves a threat, conditioned upon specified action
or inaction by a recipient of the proposal, to do what it would be impermissible . .. for the threatener
to do"); Mitchell Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 15 (2001) (basing the coerciveness of a conditional proposal on whether
"it would be wrong to carry out the act threatened").
41. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
42. Id at 2577.
43. Id. at 2572.
44. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
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government for highway projects.45 The Court ruled that these funding
conditions were not unconstitutionally coercive, but did concede that prior
"decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion."'46 So although the funding scheme
in Dole was constitutional, the Court reiterated its holding that the withdrawal
of financial benefits could rise to the level of coercion.
In Sebelius, the Court declared that it had finally found a case where
pressure had turned into compulsion, even though Congress was simply
threatening to take away a benefit that it was under no obligation to provide
in the first instance. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts declared
that "[i]n this case, the financial 'inducement' Congress has chosen is much
more than 'relatively mild encouragement'-it is a gun to the head."47 But
what was the gun to the head? It was simply a threat to remove all Medicaid
funding to a State-something that the Constitution does not require the
federal government to do in the first place. So how can it be coercive to
remove something that you are not required to do in the first place?
Justice Roberts answered that, in contrast to the modest amount of
highway funds that were at issue in Dole, the Sebelius funding scheme made
up as much as ten percent of the State's entire budget, a consequence that
constituted an "economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real
option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion."48 The States, having
grown accustomed (addicted?) to the higher amount of federal aid, would not
be able to survive once it was withdrawn-at least not without substantial
bureaucratic and financial chaos. So the majority apparently viewed the total
amount as the crucial factor, not the question of whether the threatened
consequence was illegal or not. At least in this limited circumstance, a court
viewed coercion as applying to a case where the negative consequence was
not otherwise illegal or impermissible. In essence, an offer that is too good
to refuse may constitute coercion because it seems impossible for the
recipient to forego the benefits in question.4 9
Applying this insight to the case of Russian cyber interference, one
might argue that coercion does not necessarily require a threat to commit an
45. Id at 211.
46. Id. (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
47. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
48. Id at 2604-05.
49. The philosopher Robert Nozick argues that coercion involves the substitution of the agent's
motives and intentions for the motives and intentions of the coercer. ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 48 (1981). This insight provides an opening for explaining how
the withholding of a benefit could rise to the level of coercion. In that situation, the action produced
by the withholding of the benefit might stand in a closer relationship to the coercer's motives and
intentions than to the target's motives and intentions. This is certainly the case with regard to the
coercive Medicaid expansion, which stood in a closer relationship to Congress's intention than it
did to the States' intentions.
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unlawful act, in the sense in which Nicaragua implies or Berman argues. The
sine qua non of coercion is that the threat compelled the State to act in a way
that it otherwise would not act,50 not that the threatened consequence was
illegal. If the Russian hacking constituted "threatening conduct," the lack
of a threatened consequence that is independently illegal should not be taken
as a fatal defect to the argument.
Even so, there are substantial impediments to concluding that the
Russian hacking in the 2016 election constituted illegal coercion-
impediments that raise a series of broader questions about the entire episode.
A legal finding of coercion would depend on identifying some individual or
group as the target of the coercion. Was it the American voters? Were they
coerced into voting for Trump and not for Clinton? If so, what were the
threatened consequences? One might argue that the Russian intervention
came with an implied threat to withhold benefits if Hillary Clinton were
elected and that Russia would act in a more cooperative manner towards the
United States if Trump were elected, perhaps in exchange for reciprocal
considerations from a new Trump Administration. Or perhaps one might
argue that the hacking came with the threat of future illegal behavior on the
part of the Russian government: either more instances of hacking, or more
daringly, increased military aggression in places like Crimea or eastern
Ukraine. Or, one might assume that the object of the coercion was actually
Hillary Clinton. In that regard, perhaps the point was that Clinton was
implicitly informed that she should adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward
Russia (and drop any attempts to pursue regime change in Russia or oust
Putin), and that if she did not comply, the hacking of DNC e-mails would be
the threatened consequence.52 However, it is unclear if this threat or offer
was made, either explicitly or implicitly. Furthermore, it is also unclear
whether one should equate the American electorate with the "State" itself.
Certainly, the question of whether there was coercion in this case should
be determined holistically based on the facts surrounding the intervention,
50. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 319 ("The key is that the coercive act must
have the potential for compelling the target State to engage in an action that it would otherwise not
take (or refrain from taking an action that it would otherwise take).").
5 1. This would imply that a retorsion is inherently coercive; it is not clear whether international
lawyers would be comfortable with that conclusion.
52. It is certainly the case that coercion need not be direct and may come in an indirect form:
Coercion sufficient to support a finding of unlawful intervention may take either a
direct or indirect form. In its findings of fact, the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua judgment determined that the United States had supplied assistance to
rebels, including "training, arming, equipping ... [rebel] military and paramilitary
actions in and against Nicaragua." The court held that the principle of non-intervention
"forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or
external affairs of other States."
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 319-20.
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rather than hewing formalistically to abstract requirements.53 Other scholars
have concluded that the Russian hacking included some coercive element,
implicitly rejecting the requirement of an impermissible consequence.54 One
possibility for defining coercion is simply the scale and effect of the overall
intervention, 55 which in this case was quite substantial. This is perhaps the
most important lesson of the Sebelius reasoning, where the Court looked to
the totality of the circumstances before deciding whether the actions in the
case were fundamentally coercive. However, there must be a line between
being coercive and being corrosive to the proper functioning of a democracy.
While the Russian hacking was certainly corrosive, it is genuinely unclear
whether it should count as coercive.56
C. Illegal Usurpation of a Government Function
The other possibility is that the Russian cyber hacking was illegal, not
because it constituted a coercive intervention but rather an illegal
"[u]surpation of an inherently governmental function,"57 which does not
require the element of coercion. The question is what was the inherently
governmental function in this case.
Undeniably, the holding of a federal election is an inherently
governmental function in a liberal democracy. So, in theory, the disruption
of an election should count as the usurpation of an inherently governmental
53. See id. at 319 ("A few Experts, however, argued that it is impossible to prejudge whether
an act constitutes intervention without knowing its specific context and consequences. For them,
the context and consequences of a particular act that would not normally qualify as coercive could
raise it to that level.").
54. For example, Steven Barela has concluded that,
coercion can be understood as more than simply forcing an electoral outcome. The
significance and expanse, both in scale and reach, of the interests targeted are relevant.
Whether the Russian meddling was meant to achieve a particular result in the election
(wishing to aid one candidate over another), there were also more important-even if
less tangible-matters at stake.
Barela, supra note 2.
55. See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World
Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771, 782 (1958) (suggesting
that coercion is defined by three dimensions of consequentiality, including "the importance and
number of values affected, the extent to which such values are affected and the number of
participants whose values are so affected"); Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the
Principle ofNon-Intervention, in CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICT 249, 257
(Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015) ("[McDougal's] and Feliciano's dimensions of coercion might
consider the nature of State interests affected by a cyber operation, the scale of effects the operation
produces in the target State, and the reach in terms of number of actors involuntarily affected by the
cyber operation."); Barela, supra note 2 (concluding that the McDougal and Feliciano formulation
lends support to the conclusion that the Russian hacking violated international law).
56. See also William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions After
Tallinn 2.0, 95 TEXAS L. REv. 1487, 1501 (2017) (concluding that according "to the traditional
measures, there was no coercion and no unlawful intervention" but also conceding that "because
[S]tate practice and resulting customary international law is based on examples from kinetic
conflicts ... [w]e should temper our confidence in this coercion analysis").
57. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 24.
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function. Indeed, the drafters of the Tallinn Manual listed a number of
governmental functions, including "changing or deleting data such that it
interferes with the delivery of social services, the conduct of elections, the
collection of taxes, the effective conduct of diplomacy, and the performance
of key national defence activities."5 In the 2016 election, however, the
Russian government allegedly released private information to the public,
rather than "changing or deleting" it.59 Moreover, the Tallinn Manual does
not further define what constitutes the "conduct of elections."
Everyone agrees that had the Russian government tampered with the
ballot boxes, or with electronic voting, this would count as a violation of
international law, because the counting of votes during an election is a
paradigmatically "governmental function," which in that case would be
"usurped" by Russia.6 0 Votes should be tabulated, counted, and reported by
the government officials administering the election, and any interference with
that process sounds like a usurpation of an inherently governmental function.
At this moment in time, however, there is no publicly available evidence that
the Russian cyber interference included tampering with the vote-tabulation
process.61 The interference included disclosure of private information and
possibly distribution of fake news stories, falling under the umbrella of
propaganda and violations of the right to privacy.62 We are left then with an
overall impression of illegal conduct, but without a clear and unambiguous
doctrinal route towards that conclusion.
III. A Violation of Self-Determination
Having failed to identify an unambiguous argument that the Russian
cyber interference satisfied the doctrinal requirements for an illegal
intervention under international law, this section will look at the situation
with reference to political terminology, in order to identify a better legal
framework for analysis.63 In political terms, the Russian hacking interfered
with a key element of sovereignty, insofar as sovereignty is understood as a
58. Id. at 22.
59. ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES, supra note 9, at 2-3.
60. See, e.g., Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at Berkeley Law
School on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-1 11016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B6TH-232L] ("[A] cyber operation by a State that interferes with another
country's ability to hold an election or that manipulates another country's election results would be
a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.").
61. ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES, supra note 9, at 3 (concluding that although Russian
hackers accessed computer systems of State and local electoral boards, these systems were "not
involved in vote tallying").
62. Id at 4 (describing quasigovernmental trolls as "contribut[ing] to the influence campaign").
63. I am indebted to Philip Bobbitt for discussing this point with me.
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relational concept that connects the government with the will of the people. 64
The whole point of democratic governance is that the government should
represent the will of the people, and this relationship might be called the
"sovereign will." If this is what is meant by sovereignty, then clearly the
Russian hacking constituted an interference and distortion of the sovereign
will, because the goal of the hacking was to help elect a candidate who was
sympathetic to the interests of the Russian government, rather than elect a
candidate who represented the hopes and desires of the American people.
This generates a translation problem. The notion of sovereign will
described above does not accord with the concept of sovereignty as public
international lawyers usually use the term. Of course, the word sovereignty
is notoriously slippery and vague and often generates more heat than light.65
But generally speaking, when a public international lawyer speaks of
sovereignty, they mean the right of a State to control its territory, regulate its
subjects, and be free from external military aggression, as well as lesser forms
of impermissible interventions and interference.66 Indeed, this is the notion
of sovereignty that guided our legal analysis in Parts I and II of this Article.
However, we were proceeding under the assumption that the legal notion of
sovereignty-and its companion notion of unlawful interventions against
sovereignty-was the proper legal framework for understanding an event that
politicians and even political theorists would have analyzed with the
language (their language) of sovereignty. But this assumption may be false.
The best legal analogue for the political concept of sovereignty may not be
the legal concept of sovereignty after all.
The reason for the translation problem is that the legal notion of
sovereignty is centered around the State, while the political notion of
sovereignty is not so carefully circumscribed, and often relates to the people
whose sovereign will is represented by the government and even perhaps
protected by the constitutional order.67  To the extent that something
untoward happened during the 2016 election, the relevant victim here was
not the American State but rather the American people, whose expression of
political will was interfered with. But once one shifts from discussing the
State to the people, the legal language of sovereignty becomes singularly
64. For example, Rousseau would have referred to this as the "general will." See JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 22 (G.D.H. Cole ed. & trans., J.M.
Dent & Sons 1913) (1761).
65. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 1 (1999) (noting the misuse of the word "sovereignty"
through history and arguing that its meaning "is confused and its uses are various, some of them
unworthy, some even destructive of human values").
66. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-07 (7th ed.
2008) (noting that sovereignty is used liberally by lawyers to describe the "complexity and diversity
of the rights, duties, powers, liberties, and immunities of states").
67. For example, the Tenth Amendment reserves all powers (not otherwise delegated in the
U.S. Constitution) to the "States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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unhelpful for describing the situation. The closest analogue in international
law to this political notion of sovereign will is the principle of self-
determination, the right of all peoples to determine for themselves their
political destiny. That is the norm that was violated during the election.
The election process is the ultimate expression of a people's sovereign
will. By illicit interference, the Russians influenced the election to produce
the sovereign will of the Russian people (or its government), rather than the
sovereign will of the American people. Arguably, Russia was concerned that
Clinton would pursue regime change as official U.S. policy and viewed this
possibility as an existential threat.68 The interference substituted one
sovereign will for the other as an outcome of the election. Doing so violated
the right of the American people to self-determination.
There are several reasons why international lawyers have been
unwilling to discuss this incident with the language of self-determination,
which is part of a more general hesitation surrounding the legalization of the
right of self-determination. First, self-determination is usually invoked as an
argument for constructing a State (perhaps through secession),69 but once a
State has been created, the legal discourse usually shifts to State sovereignty
and the principle of self-determination fades into the background. But that
fading away is not legally required; indeed, a people's right to self-
determination does not disappear once it succeeds in creating a State to fulfill
its self-determination. The concept of State sovereignty does not entirely
exhaust the principle of self-determination, which remains an important
guiding principle and runs parallel to the legal concept of State sovereignty.
The second problem with invoking self-determination in this context is
that the argument presupposes that we can identify, ex ante, the sovereign
will of the American people, before viewing the results of the election-the
process which defines the sovereign will as its ultimate expression. So, for
example, a critic might look at the election results and say that the resulting
election of Trump was the expression of the American people's self-
determination, and there is little empirical evidence to the contrary. That
being said, perhaps it is possible to identify the true expression of a people's
self-determination by invoking counterfactual thinking, which is
commonplace in legal discourse. In the absence of the Russian interference,
the election would have proceeded quite differently, suggesting that the
68. ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES, supra note 9, at 1 ("Putin most likely wanted to discredit
Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against
his regime in late 2011 and early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost
certainly saw as disparaging him.").
69. See Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 283 (discussing the limits on the right to self-
determination when that right would violate the territorial integrity or political unity of the State).
For a discussion, see generally MILENA STEIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: "SELFISTANS," SECESSION, AND THE RULE OF THE GREAT POWERS (2013)
(surveying the theory of self-determination and analyzing the right as applied to five locations
interested in secession).
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actions of Russia distorted and interfered with the American people's right
of self-determination.7 0
The third problem is that concluding that Russia violated the American
people's right to self-determination might entail that in previous elections it
was the United States that violated the right to self-determination when it
meddled in the political and electoral process of a foreign nation. 71 But the
mere fact that the United States itself may have violated the norm in prior
occasions does not necessarily entail that the United States cannot be
victimized by similarly illegal conduct or that the activity is not illegal.
Widespread noncompliance does not automatically transform the behavior
into compliance, the rules of customary international law (via State practice)
notwithstanding. More importantly, even if the United States has engaged in
such meddling before, it is important to distinguish between political
interference in dictatorships and other illiberal systems versus interference in
genuinely democratic elections. 72 The former violates the principle of self-
determination while the latter does not.73 Indeed, it should count as a virtue
of the self-determination rubric that it helpfully distinguishes between
interventions that frustrate democratic self-government and interventions that
support it. Furthermore, it is a vice of the blunt tool of State sovereignty that
as a legal concept it is incapable of making such crucial distinctions.
Conclusion
We should be clear on specifically how the self-determination legal
analysis differs from the sovereignty analysis. Both analyses agree that
interference with a foreign political process might be illegal.74 Indeed, as
70. But see ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES, supra note 9, at i ("We did not make an
assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election.").
71. See Ishaan Tharoor, The Long History of the U.S. Interfering with Elections Elsewhere,
WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/13/
the-long-history-of-the-u-s-interfering-with-elections-elsewhere/?utm term=.3 12a2b7fea If
[https://perma.cc/EPL7-CPYH] (giving examples of U.S. interference in Iran, Chile, and Guatemala
among others).
72. Some historical examples of U.S. meddling in foreign political processes arguably involved
the frustration of democratic processes in favor of nondemocratic regimes that were viewed as more
friendly to U.S. interests.
73. In fact, this is a core difference between the sovereignty and self-determination frameworks;
the concept of sovereignty leaves little room for discriminating between political arrangements.
74. For example, the Tallinn Manual concludes:
[Tlhe matter most clearly within a State's domaine riservd appears to be the choice of
both the political system and its organization, as these issues lie at the heart of
sovereignty. Thus, cyber means that are coercive in nature may not be used to alter or
suborn modification of another State's government or social structure.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 315.
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long ago as the Nicaragua case, the ICJ concluded that sovereignty entails
the "choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the
formulation of foreign policy."s7 What is different is that proceeding under
the doctrine of self-determination escapes the formalistic and doctrinal
requirements for illegal interventions, including the requirement of coercion.
75. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 107, T 205.
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